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Covington: An Episode in the Third Seminole War

AN EPISODE IN THE THIRD SEMINOLE WAR
by J AMES W. C OVINGTON
THIRD S EMINOLE WAR covers the period from December
1855 to the spring of 1858. Although this war brought to
a complete standstill nearly all economic growth in central and
southern Florida and involved a large expenditure of money and
men by national and state forces, it has been virtually ignored by
writers who have preferred to pay more attention to the much
more famous conflict which lasted from 1835 to 1842. 1 The
Second Seminole War attained national attention because the
Indians were not crushed and because such well-known figures as
Thomas Jesup, Zachary Taylor, Winfield Scott, Richard K. Call,
William S. Harney, and the Indians Wildcat and Osceola played
prominent roles in the struggle.
The Third Seminole War could not duplicate the tragic spectacle of an Osceola captured while protected by a flag of truce, or
3,000 persons taken by force from their homes and transported
more than 1,000 miles to Indian reservations west of the Mississippi. However, during this war of the 1850s, Oscen Tustenuggee, Billy Bowlegs, and their warriors ran virtual circles about
federal and state troops and struck heavy blows against the hapless
enemy. It was not until nearly two full years had lapsed after the
opening skirmish that an effective American fighting machine was
ready for action against the hostiles.
The war began when the Seminoles, becoming alarmed about
the several surveying and scouting parties moving through their
temporary reserve, attacked one such party. As it turned out, the
Indians were probably right in making this drastic decision to
make a last ditch fight to defend themselves, since Secretary of
HE

1. This article is part of a general study of the Third Seminole War
by the author which is soon to be published. The two best studies
relating to the history of the Seminoles, Grant Foreman’s Indian
Removal (Norman, 1953), and Edwin C. McReynolds’ The Seminoles (Norman, 1957), pay little attention to the Third Seminole
War. This is equally the case with William C. Sturtevant’s “Accomplishments and Opportunities in Florida Indian Ethnology,”
Florida Anthropology, Charles H. Fairbanks, ed., Florida Anthropological Society Publications No. 4, (1958).
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War Jefferson Davis already had reached the decision to force the
remaining Seminoles to leave Florida. According to one account,
although not entirely trustworthy, leaders and warriors representing every Florida band were invited to participate in a general
council which would determine future tribal policy. 2 In the past,
whenever the Seminoles had faced a serious crisis, they had
sought a solution by scheduling a general assembly. For instance,
in a conference held in the Everglades in April 1841, the Indians
had decreed that any Seminole, male or female, found communicating with the enemy would be put to death. 3
The site selected for parley in the fall of 1855 was a hammock “on the east side of Taylor’s Creek north-east of Lake Okeechobee, near present Okeechobee.” 4 The Indians who gathered
generally agreed on an offensive policy, and decided that whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself, they would attack a
survey party. According to the only account of this council, Tiger,
a warrior in the “prime of life,” forcefully presented the arguments in favor of military action. Chipco, on the other hand,
opposed a war, and according to the same source some of his
warriors refused to support him until he agreed to follow the
decision of the majority.
There were approximately 400 Seminoles-men, women, and
children-then living in southern Florida. Some spoke Muskogee
or Creek; the remainder spoke a related but not mutually intelligible language called Mikasuki, a dialect of Hitchiti. 5 Sometimes
members of one group had difficulty communicating with persons
from the other group. Villages were situated along the northern
rim of Lake Okeechobee and the area which included the Kissimmee River, Fisheating Creek, Lakes Tohopekaliga, Kissimmee,
Istokpoga, Hamilton, and adjacent lakes or waterways. Other
villages were found in the Everglades extending south of Lake
Okeechobee.
The one Seminole who was most influential and who had the
2. J o h n O . P a r r i s h , B a t t l i n g t h e S e m i n o l e s ( L a k e l a n d , 1 9 3 0 ) , 2 1 5 .
3. John T. Sprague, The Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War (New York, 1848), 317. See also facsimile edition with
introduction by John Mahon (Gainesville, 1964).
4 . Parrish, Battling the Seminoles, 215.
5. John Goggin,
Source Materials for the Study of the Florida Seminole
I n d i a n s , ” Laboratory Notes No. 3, University of Florida Anthropology Laboratory (August 1949), 2.
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greatest authority and prestige was Holatter Micco or Billy Bowlegs. According to John T. Sprague, noted historian of the Second
Seminole War, Bowlegs was “a bold, resolute and unyielding
leader. [He is] ambitious, and cunning, remarkably intelligent,
6
Holatter Micco was included
speaking English with facility.”
within the ranks of the Seminole “royal family,” and he counted
among his ancestors such leaders as the first Bowlegs, King Payne,
and Micanopy. 7 His family connections alone, however, did not
entitle Bowlegs to his leadership position among the Indians.
Otulke-Thlocke the Prophet also had considerable influence within the tribe, and during the final stages of the Second Seminole
War was more effective in asserting his authority in tribal matters
than Billy Bowlegs. By the end of that conflict, however, the
Prophet, because of his timidity and falsehoods, had lost his influence and no longer threatened Billy as principal leader. 8
Billy Bowlegs, as the most important Seminole, and his two
sub-chiefs, Fuse-Hadjo and Nocose Mathla, signed the peace arrangements with Colonel William J. Worth in August 1842.
Assinwah, Billy’s father-in-law and another important leader, acknowledged the guiding role of Bowlegs by rendering faithful
service to him. Sam Jones or Arpeika had become so aged and
senile by the time of the Third Seminole War that his influence
had waned within the tribe. There were other important leaders,
including Chipco, Ismathtee, and Oscen Tustenuggee, but none
so influential as Billy Bowlegs.
The constant flow of visitors and the interchange of news
indicated the good relationship which existed between the Muskogees and the Mikasukis. It was possible for the young people to
meet at the several dances to which all members of the tribe were
invited. As a result, there was some divisional intermarriage.
Customarily the bridegroom and his bride lived with or near the
dwelling of her parents. An informed census taken of the Seminoles in 1852 revealed that a number of Muskogee men were livSprague to Adjutant-General R. Jones, January 11, 1847, 526,
Seminole Agency, 1846-1855, Records of Office of Indian Affairs,
National Archives, Washington. This letter, edited by James W.
Covington, “The Florida Seminoles in 1847,” appeared in Tequesta,
XXIV (1964), 49-57.
Kenneth W. Porter, “The Cowkeeper Dynasty of the Seminole Nation,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXX (April 1952), 341-49.
Sprague, The Florida War, 512-13.
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ing among the Mikasuki, and some Mikasuki men were found in
Muskogee villages with their wives and their in-laws. 9
From available evidence contributed both by Seminole and
white sources, it seems likely that Chipco did oppose the war, but
he obviously was not able to keep his band neutral during the
conflict. Since some Mikasuki warriors, including war leaders
Oscen Tustenuggee and his brother Micco Tustenuggee, had
married women from Chipco’s band, and, in accordance with
Seminole tradition were living with their m-laws, they were able
to influence many of Chipco’s warriors. In order to avoid suffering
a Charley Emathla fate, Chipco accompanied his men on some of
the raids, including the attack on the Starling wagon train. Chipco did not bear any special hatred toward the whites though, and
apparently he retained their friendship. 10
An opportunity to deal a crushing blow against the scouting
parties was presented on December 7, 1855, when Second Lieutenant George Lucas Hartsuff of the Second Artillery, accompanied by ten men (six mounted men, two foot soldiers, and two
teamsters), left Fort Myers and moved up through the center of
southwestern Florida then occupied by Billy Bowlegs and his
bands. Ten days later, Monday, December 17, the force encamped on a pine island approximately three miles from the camp
that Billy Bowlegs had used the previous year. The following
morning, Hartsuff and three men entered the deserted village. As
they left “some of the party took a bunch of bananas.” 11 The next
day, December 19, the force visited other Indian villages, which
they also found deserted. Hartsuff’s orders were to return his
force to Fort Myers the next day, and the men, knowing they had
a long march ahead of them, turned in early. Meanwhile, under
cover of darkness, a party of Seminoles, wearing black and white
plumes in their hair, was moving toward the pine tree patch. At
approximately five o’clock on the morning of December 20, just
as the soldiers were saddling up their horses and packing the
9.
10.

Jacksonville The Florida News, August 27, 1853.
Tampa Sunday Tribune, July 15, 1956. On the grounds that he
was friendly towards the whites, Charley Emathla was killed by
order of Osceola and no Indian would touch his body. It was finally
buried by the whites.
11. An account of the banana stealing episode and the battle is found
in Ray B. Seley, Jr., “Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana Plants,”
Tequesta, XXIII (1963), 3-14.
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wagons for the return to Fort Myers, the Indians attacked. Several
men were wounded or killed in the initial firing, but the others
were able to retreat to a nearby hammock where they could use
their own muskets. After killing four soldiers and wounding four
others, including Hartsuff, the Seminole attackers withdrew. Judging from the advantage that they had possessed, it is surprising that
the Seminoles did not completely overwhelm the camp and kill
more of the defenders. The Hartsuff attack on Thursday, December 20, 1855, marks the beginning of the Third Seminole War,
the final Indian war in Florida. It is sometimes known as the Billy
Bowlegs War.
Acting under authority of an act passed by the Florida legislature in January 1853, Governor James Broome tried to organize
as many volunteer companies as possible to resist the Indian uprising. The state’s finances were in a precarious condition at the
time, and Broome had to check with federal authorities concerning
expenditures for these forces. By January 12, 1856, Broome had
accepted six companies and had ordered them to protect the
frontier. These units were composed of citizens from Manatee,
Hillsborough, and Hernando counties, and they had been armed,
equipped, and rationed with the assistance of private funds. The
force was offered to the Secretary of War, but Jefferson Davis only
accepted three mounted companies and two infantry units. 12
Since Governor Broome believed that the number of men mustered into federal service was insufficient to meet both the offensive and defensive needs of Florida, he retained in active service
under state control the companies commanded by Captains Francis M. Durrance, LeRoy C. Lesley, William H. Kendrick, Abner
D. Johnson, and the detachment under Lieutenant John Addison
- a total of 400 men. 13
Each company was required to have seventy-four privates, two musicians, four corporals, four sergeants, one second lieutenant, one
first lieutenant, and one captain. Captain A. Gibson to AdjutantGeneral, April 12, 1856. Letters received, Orders and Ordinance
returns, 1856, War Department. Contemporary records indicated
that it was very difficult to recruit foot soldiers.
13. The headquarters of the four state mounted companies included:
Kendrick, Fort Broome (Hernando County frontier); Durrance,
Fort Fraser (area east of Peace River); Wesley, site unselected
(Lower Peace River and Manatee River areas), and Jernigan, Fort
Gatlin (one half of the company operating east of St. Johns River
and other half cooperating with Johnson’s Company). See message
of Governor Broome, November 24, 1856, Florida House Journal
(1856), 12.
12.
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In anticipation of a possible outbreak of hostilities, the war
department assembled in southern Florida a force of men twice as
large as the state had been able to mobilize. Scattered about the
peninsula were the following units from the First Artillery: Fort
Capron on the Indian River, eighty-one men; Fort Dallas at Miami, 168 men; and the barracks at Key West, eighty-eight men.
The garrisons of the Second Artillery included 217 men at Fort
Myers, and 247 at Fort Brooke on Tampa Bay. 14
By March 1, 1856, an impressive number of Indian fighters
had been assembled to protect the frontier from raiders and to
pursue the hostiles deep into the Florida wilderness. There were
800 federal troops stationed in South Florida; 260 state troops in
federal service; and 400 troops in state service. Opposing this
force of 1,460 men were about 100 Seminole warriors. The
Indians were outnumbered by nearly fifteen to one.
Even with such an apparent overwhelming strength, the
military units were badly disorganized. There was poor liaison
between Colonel John Monroe, federal commander in Florida, and
General Jesse Carter, special agent for the Florida militia. Part of
the trouble developed from Carter’s initial orders to each of his
four company commanders late in February 1856. In a communication to Captain William Kendrick, Carter wrote: “One-half of
your command will be required to rendezvous at your headquarters
and be performing active frontier service, while you will encourage the remaining half to plant and cultivate crops and relieve
them alternately at such intervals as you may deem practicable.” 15
Similar orders were dispatched to the other commanders. Carter
was thus cutting his fighting strength by half.
During the first few months of the conflict, some observers
noted defects in the militia and regular military organizations
and expressed their concern. After a raid on Sarasota Bay in
March 1856, this comment appeared in a Tampa paper: “While
the Indians are committing their depredations with an audacity
unsurpassed, our meager forces are engaged in guarding posts
and sending out small detachments of mounted men on scouting
14. Statement by U.S. Adjutant-General S. Cooper, November 27, 1855,
House of Representatives, Executive Document I, Part III, 34th
Cong., 1st Sess., No. 841.
15. Jesse Carter to William Kendrick, February 27, 1856, Florida House
J o u r n a l (1856), 67. See also Carter to A. D. Johnson and Francis
Durrance, ibid., 67-69.
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service, in an open portion of the Indian territory, where Indians
can never be seen, and in protecting the frontier! What have
they accomplished? Are the Indians to be removed by this force?
The idea is as absurd as it is foolhardy . . . Billy understands all
this, consequently his temerity.” 16
While most Floridians by the 1850s had believed that they
could easily quell the small handful of Indians if there were
trouble, their initial activities against the Seminoles were feeble.
Instead of moving directly into Indian territory and carrying the
war into the foe’s backyard, the military remained on the defensive, and, whenever patrols moved out, they generally tried to
stay on travelled roads and trails, obviously the place where
Indians would not likely be discovered. Oscen Tustenuggee and
his friends quickly noted this lack of strategy, and began utilizing
the tactics they had learned during the final phases of the Second
Seminole War: ambush, a rapid volley, and a hasty retreat. This
type of fighting had proved effective in the Second Seminole War,
and it would work again for the Indians in 1856.
While state and federal forces were mobilizing, the Seminoles
were readying a series of offensive strikes, aimed at hitting the
thin line of frontier settlements and outposts. It must be understood that Seminole raids were not planned in great detail by the
leaders, but were arranged more on the “spur of the moment.”
During the Third Seminole War the Indians never based their
forays upon a general pattern designed either to win the war or
to drive the white man from Florida, The limited purposes of
the raids seem to have been to revenge past wrongs or to obtain
slaves, arms, and war booty.
Judging from available evidence, it appeared that war leader
Oscen Tustenuggee and his friends in the Muskogee and Mikasuki bands assumed the responsibility for carrying out the offensive phases of the war. 17 Angry because post commander Major
Lewis Arnold and his regulars had burned their village, the Seminoles kept a close watch over Fort Denaud on the Caloosahatchee
River. On January 18, 1856, a wood party consisting of a cor16. Tampa Florida Peninsular, March 8, 1856.
17. Oscen Tustenuggee had come from a village situated on Fisheating
Creek some two or three miles from present day Palmdale. For an
account concerning this Seminole leader see Tampa Tribune, June
19, 1960.
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poral and five privates was returning to the fort with a load of
cypress logs when suddenly a force of fifteen or twenty Seminoles
rose from the palmettoes along the crude trail and began firing
at the soldiers sitting atop the wagons. Five soldiers and twelve
mules were killed in the ambush, and only one wounded survivor
was able to make his way back to the fort where he identified
Oscen Tustenuggee as the leader of the ambushers. 18 Other
Seminole raiding-parties burned a house at present-day Sarasota,
ambushed a boat patrol on Turner’s River, and attacked a settlement near present-day Miami. One such party, returning from
a successful strike at the Braden plantation in present-day
Bradenton, was overtaken during lunch time on Big Charley
Apopka Creek (Charlo-Popka-Hatchee-Chee or Payne’s Creek?)
by a force of militiamen. The Indians lost two warriors, seven
slave prisoners, three mules, and one pony. Oscen Tustenuggee
led on this raid. While he lost his pony, he was able to escape. 19
The next time the Seminoles struck again at the scattered
settlements, they travelled some distance northward of their previous raids. At the tiny outpost of Darby, in the central part of
present-day Pasco County, lived Captain Robert Bradley, a
veteran of the Second Seminole War, his wife, several children,
and his Negro slaves. On the evening of May 14, 1856, two of
the younger children were playing in the passageway between
the double-log cabin house. Everything seemed quiet and peaceful. Then suddenly the scene changed to one of terror. A bland
of some fifteen Indians had crept undetected up to the house and
opened fire at the unsuspecting children. The frantic mother
attempted to save her screaming youngsters and became a target
herself. Before Bradley, rising from a sick bed, was able to join
his older sons and return the gunfire, the two younger children
were killed. 20 Although news of the attack was carried to a
18. Alexander S. Webb, “Campaigning in Florida in 1855,” Journal of
the Military Service Institutions (November-December 1912), 410-12.
19. For accounts of the attack on the Braden plantation see Carter to
Broome, April 12, 1856, Florida House Journal (1856), Appendix,
85-86, and Tampa Florida Peninsular, April 12, 1856. Also see John
Monroe to Cooper, April 16, 1856, M265, Department of Florida,
1856, Box 27, War Department.
20. Palatka National Democrat quoted in Tallahassee Floridian and
Journal, May 31, 1856; S. Churchill to Monroe, May 15, 1856,
C3, War Department Records, 1856; D. B. McKay, ed., Pioneer
Florida, 3 vols. (Tampa, 1959), II, 566-67.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol45/iss1/8

8

Covington: An Episode in the Third Seminole War
A N E PISODE

IN THE

T HIRD S EMINOLE W AR

53

militia post and militiamen hurried to the Bradley homestead, the
Indians were able to make their escape. 21 The soldiers did find
the body of an Indian killed by Bradley. It seemed odd that the
Indians had attacked Darby while by-passing other more likely
targets. A possible reason for the attack was that Captain Bradley
had killed the brother of Tigertail during the Second Seminole
War.
Indian scouts, probably from the same party that took part
in the Darby attack, had been observing the traffic along the
several military roads leading from Tampa into the interior, and
they planned to ambush a wagon train. On Saturday, May 17,
1856, a three-wagon mule train carrying grain from Fort Brooke
to Fort Fraser had stopped for water at a small creek, when the
young son of Teamster John Starling noticed a Seminole hiding
behind a pine tree. He quickly called to his father, but before
an alarm could be sounded, the Indians opened fire. Three men
escaped the ambush and alarmed the settlers at the camp-ground,
but the two Starlings and a Mr. Roach were killed. 22 The hero
of this brief skirmish was Tom Hatfield who stood between two
mules and maintained a constant fire against the foe. Realizing
that he was the only living person remaining in the train, Hatfield
jumped on a mule and made his escape. 23
One of the most important battles of the war took place on
June 14-16, 1856, when a Seminole raiding party struck at an
isolated farm and, in turn, was attacked by two militia units.
In December 1855, Willoughby Tillis, his wife, and seven children moved from Tampa to a homestead site situated near
Whidden Creek some three and one-half miles from Fort Meade.
While their house was being built, the Tillis family occupied a
makeshift storage shelter. Travellers had been warning Tillis
for some time that he was exposing his family to Indian raiding
J. A. Hendley, History of Pasco County, Florida (Dade City, n.d.),
4, 16.
22. Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 24, 1856; Tampa Tribune, December 4, 1955.
23. Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 24, 1856; Tamba Tribune, October
30, 1955. The site of the wagon train ambush has been marked
by the Hillsborough County Historical Commission. It is on U.S.
Highway 92 between Tampa and Plant City, some thirteen miles
from Tampa. Until 1932, a pine tree in which shot was embedded
could be found at the site, but it was removed during a widening
of the roadway.

21.
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parties, and finally he moved his wife and children to the Russell
farm a mile and a half from Fort Meade. The well-constructed
double-cabin pine log house, complete with connecting walkway,
brick chimney, and with no visible openings between logs, was
shared with another refugee family - Thomas Underhill, his wife,
and three children. 24
On the morning of June 14, while milking her cows, Mrs.
Celia Tillis saw an Indian peering at her through the pine rails
of the cattlepen. Another look showed others hiding by the rails.
She screamed a warning to her Negro slave Aunt Line and to her
two boys, and they all raced toward the house. The Seminoles
immediately opened fire at the house and its occupants. Underhill, who had been sleeping in the separate cabin connected by
the walkway to the Tillis portion of the house, ran to join the
others, but in his haste, left all of his ammunition in the other
cabin. Since she was the smallest, it was decided that Aunt Line
should crawl under the walkway from one cabin to the other for
the ammunition. 25 The Negro slave was able to make the trip
safely, but later she was slightly wounded on the forehead.
Tillis and Underhill returned an effective fire by shooting
through the narrow opening between the logs and brick chimney.
Underhill killed an Indian on his first shot which stopped their
rush on the house. Since the gun smoke indicated their position,
the two whites would fire and then jump back to a safer spot.
When the battle ended, it was discovered that nearly all the
Indian bullets had lodged within a half-inch of the chimney gap,
and a few had passed through the opening and had lodged in
the cabin walls.
In the midst of the skirmish, Lafayette Tillis ran from the
barn to the house. He had returned from Fort Meade late at
night and had retired to the barnloft so as not to disturb the rest
of the household. Young Tillis said that the Indians had attempted
to burn the barn, but since they had no matches, they were un24.

25.

William Hooker to Broome, June 19, 1856, Tampa Florida Peninsular, July 5, 1856; Tampa Sunday Tribune, April 4, 1954. “Original Narratives of Indian Attacks in Florida: An Indian Attack of
1856 on the Home of Willoughby Tillis: Narrative of James Dallas
Tillis,” Florida Historical Quarterly, VIII (April 1930), 179-87.
McKay, Pioneer Florida, II, 574-75. The two accounts of the Tillis
affairs which were given by James Dallas Tillis differ in significant
detail and must be regarded with suspicion. Yet, they present
valuable information not available elsewhere.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol45/iss1/8

10

Covington: An Episode in the Third Seminole War
A N E PISODE

IN THE

T HIRD S EMINOLE W AR

55

able to start a blaze. Underhill’s horse was in the barn, and they
cut his throat and shot the dozen horses owned by Tillis that
were grazing in a nearby field.
Daniel Carlton’s two young sons, driving cattle to pasture,
heard the prolonged firing and informed their father, who hurried
26
There were only a few militiato Fort Meade with the news.
men available to answer the call for help, but Second Lieutenant
Alderman Carlton from Captain Durrance’s Company, who was
visiting his family at Fort Meade, assumed command of a hastilyassembled relief force. It included Lott Whidden and Daniel
H. Carlton, Lieutenant Carlton’s son, from Durrance’s Company
Three, Florida Mounted Volunteers at Fort Fraser (Bartow),
John C. Oats of Captain LeRoy Lesley’s Company Seven, Florida
Mounted Volunteers at Manatee (Bradenton), and William
Parker, John H. Hollingsworth, and William McCulloch from
Captain William B. Hooker’s Company M, Florida Mounted
Volunteers in federal service at Fort Meade. This militia group
moved out quickly toward the besieged farmhouse, but hearing
the soldiers approaching, the Indians retreated into a heavily
wooded thicket nearby and awaited the inevitable clash. 27
Thickets, with their large trees and dense underbrush and
vines, made excellent natural forts for the Indians. They were
able to take their toll as the soldiers clawed their way through
the tangled undergrowth. Once the attackers came within ten
feet of each other, the engagement developed into a series of
individual combats - one person stalking the other through the
heavy vegetation. Usually after a single rifle or musket shot, the
attacker or defender was forced to fight with the aid of a knife,
or using his rifle as a club, or even wrestling.
Tillis warned Lieutenant Carlton and his men that the Indians outnumbered them two to one. Nonetheless, three militiamen raced to one side of the Indian position; the remaining four
took the opposite side, and both wings closed on the enemy. When
Private Daniel H. Carlton saw William McCulloch holding a
26. Tampa Tribune, April 4, 1954.
27. Francis Durrance to Carter, June 14, 1856, Florida House Journal
(1856), Appendix 21. The site of the Tillis farm house battle and
the skirmish between seven militiamen and the Seminoles has been
worked extensively by phosphate mining operations in the area,
and the exact location of these two sites is virtually impossible to
determine at this time.
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Seminole on the ground, he came to his aid and cut the Indian’s
throat. Not only were the whites greatly outnumbered, but the
Indian position in the wooded area was very strong, and the
militiamen were forced to withdraw. In the brief but bloody
engagement, Lieutenant Alderman Carlton and two of his men,
Lott Whidden and William Parker, had been killed, and John
C. Oats, Daniel H. Carlton, and John Hollingsworth were
wounded. One Indian had been killed, and it was believed that
he was an important leader. 28
News of the skirmish was carried by Private Daniel H. Carlton to Fort Fraser, and Captain Francis Durrance dispatched
First Sergeant F. C. M. Boggess and Second Sergeant Joseph L.
Durrance with fifteen men to the scene. Another patrol of eight
or ten men, led by First Lieutenant Streaty Parker of Lesley’s
Company, reached the Tillis place and followed the retreating
Indians from the thicket where the struggle had taken place into
a hammock which offered a better defensive position. The original band of Indians was believed to have been joined by one or
more parties, and Lieutenant Parker decided to return to Fort
Meade for reinforcements and more provisions. 29
After a brief rest at Fort Meade, the aroused and reinforced
militiamen emerged ready for battle. On June 16, 1856, twentyfive men under Lieutenant Parker searched through the swamplands along the Peace River, believed to be the hiding place of
the hostiles. The following morning, five men were left to
guard the horses, one went after provisions, and the remaining
nineteen hunted for the elusive foe. At ten o’clock, the Seminole
camp was discovered, and a quick rush gave the half-asleep sentry
little chance to warn his fellows. 30 The two shots fired at the
The Seminoles were unable to recover the body of the dead Indian.
Tied to the axle tree of a cart, it was carried to Fort Meade for
examination by a doctor. Since the Indian carried many herbs on
his person, the whites concluded that he must have been a medicine
man or shaman. The body was buried within the stockade at Fort
Meade. See Tampa Tribune, April 4, 1954.
29. Hooker to Broome, June 19, 1856, Tampa Florida Peninsular, July
5, 1856.
30. Ibid. Since the water level of the Peace River has been changed by
phosphate mining operations and much of the extensive forest
cover has been cut by lumbermen, exact location of the Peace
River battle presents a challenge to the local historian. The author
is greatly indebted to William Bevis of Fort Meade for guiding him
to possible scenes of the several skirmishes.
28.
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guard aroused the Seminoles, and they quickly sought cover in
the woods or tried to swim the river. War leader Oscen Tustenuggee was shot and killed in mid-stream, but his brother, Micco
Tustenuggee, saved himself by diving off his horse and swimming
underwater to the thickly-wooded bank on the other side. 31
Once they had recovered from the initial shock, the Indians
began returning an effective fire. A high bluff on the opposite
side of the river served as a rallying spot for the hostiles. Gunfire
from the higher ground killed George Howell and Robert Prine,
and wounded James Whidden, William Brooker, and John Skipper. Seeing that they controlled the fighting at this point, some
Indians moved across the river, hoping to create a flanking fire.
With his force reduced to fourteen able-bodied men, Lieutenant
Parker decided to retreat, carrying his wounded along with him.
At Brooker’s place, a previously-designated rendezvous point, the
wounded were treated by a physician and reinforcements joined
the party. The dead bodies had been recovered from the battlefield, and the wounded and dead were carried to Fort Meade.
Besides Lieutenant Parker from Lesley’s Company, the forces
in this battle included twelve men from Durrance’s Company,
three from Hooker’s Company, and one from Sparkman’s Company. These figures show that Hooker’s Company at Fort Meade
was not strong enough to defend the countryside from attacking Seminoles.
After removing the dead and wounded, a small army of reinforced militiamen under Captain William Hooker made a determined effort to overtake the Indians. One force of twenty-three
men marched five miles on the evening of June 16. Searching
through the swamps the next two days, Hooker found the burned
Chockaniola bridge, one dead Indian covered by a Starling wagon
train canvas, some pools of blood left by dead or wounded Seminoles, but no live Indians. Detachments led by Lieutenants E. T.
Kendrick (twenty-five men), B. S. Sparkman (thirteen men), and
John Parker also searched through the same general area without
finding any Seminoles. The hard pursuit through the heavily
wooded country caused some men to become ill; others suffered
3 1 . T a m p a T r i b u n e , J u n e 1 9 , 1 9 6 0 . O s c e n T u s t e n u g g e e ’s b o d y w a s
hidden in a palmetto patch by the Indians, and several nights later
two men returned and erected a log pen about his body. This pen
was discovered and the body was removed by the soldiers.
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from the swarms of mosquitoes prevalent during the summer.
By June 20, the Florida forces had given up the pursuit and had
returned to their home bases.
At first it appeared that the militia had scored a victory in
the Peace River Valley battle. One observer claimed some time
later that killing the Indians had been as easy as shooting ducks,
and Florida Governor Broome was certain that as many as fifteen
had been killed in the battle. 32 Yet facts to the contrary were
disclosed at the same time. M. P. Lyons wrote to Colonel Monroe
presenting another side to the picture: “Hooker, instead of chasing
Indians, bothered more with gathering up his herd of cattle and
driving them to sale. Many Indian signs around but he ignored
them. When Indians attacked Mr. Tillis house in vicinity of
Fort Meade only seven men were mustered and three of them
belonged to Captain Hooker’s Company C. (Most of men on
beef scout). Seven men dashed to relief of Tillis and three were
killed and two wounded. When Hooker heard the news he came
when the dead were being carried from the field.” 33
The first skirmish near the Tillis house was certainly an
Indian victory. Three whites lost their lives, and when the whereabouts of the Indians was discovered, a sizeable force could not
be mustered against them. A determined but inadequate detail
of nineteen men charged the enemy and were driven back. Finally when a larger force was organized, the Indians could not be
discovered. If the militia stationed at Fort Meade had been at
full or even at half strength, the Indians might have been defeated or even crushed, but most of the militiamen were engaged
in the pursuit of private business of herding cattle. 34
Evidence concerning the wretched condition of the Florida
32.
33.

34.

Fort Meade Leader in Tampa Tribune, October 26, 1958. For
Broome’s remarks see Florida House Journal (1856), 13.
M. P. Lyons to Monroe, July 7, 1856, L7, Box 27, War Department
Records, 1856. Lyons preferred charges against Hooker for neglect
of duty. Robert F. Prine, George Howell, Alderman Carlton, William
Parker, and Lott Whidden were buried together in a common grave
at Fort Meade. The spot is marked by a stone monument erected
in 1964.
Hooker claimed that he was alerted by the full moon and moved
to Manatee (Bradenton) in order to prevent a possible attack there.
When the attack did not develop, he went to Horse Creek where the
Indians usually obtained a supply of potatoes. At this place, two
scouts sent to obtain information at Fort Green, returned and
informed him about the Tillis attack. See Hooker’s report as printed
in Tampa Florida Peninsular, July 5, 1856.
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militia was apparent in the messages written by General Jesse
Carter during June 1856. In a letter to Captain Kendrick at
Fort Broome he expressed disappointment at not having met Kendrick at the post. He was also surprised to learn that thirty-two
men had been given twenty-day furloughs. 35 While the Indians
were attacking in the South, Carter, Captain Lesley with eighteen
men, and Captain Sparkman with sixteen men, were searching
through the hammocks of Chochochattee and Annuttaliga in Hernando County. 36 When news of the Tillis attack reached Carter
on June 16, he suggested that Sparkman and his force return
to the southern frontier, but it was not until the afternoon of
June 19 that the unit made its departure. In his report, Carter
tersely noted: “I regret to say, the harmony of cooperation was
on the morning of that day, disturbed by an impropriety on the
part of Capt. Sparkman, followed by language very discourteous
to me.” 37
The victory claims were further deflated when several Seminole women captured a short time later alleged that only twelve
warriors had been involved in the Peace River skirmish. Of this
number, two were killed on shore, two in the water, and two
were wounded. 38 The Indian account was at complete variance
with the one offered by the whites, but such variations were typical in frontier history. An Indian could not be claimed as being
dead until his body was seen and counted with the general total.
Although some of the poorest features of the militia system
appeared during this period, substantial gains were also realized
by the whites. First and foremost, the power of the Seminoles
to carry out offensive strikes deep into the settled area was broken
by the deaths of war leader Oscen Tustenuggee and other warriors in the Peace River fighting. No longer could the Indians
carry out such raids, and even when soldiers and militiamen
swarmed through their heartland, the warriors hid in the hammocks and grasslands, hoping that they would not be discovered.
The Seminoles remained a threat and struck at unwary soldiers,
but they did not undertake any raids in force to the north.
C a r t e r t o K e n d r i c k , J u n e 2 1 , 1 8 5 6 , F l o r i d a H o u s e Journal
(1856), Appendix, 122-23.
36. Carter to John Monroe, June 24, 1856, ibid., 124-25.
37. Ibid.
38. W . W . M o r r i s t o C a p t a i n P a g e , J u l y 2 6 , 1 8 5 7 , M 1 2 0 , Box 30,
War Department, 1857.
35.
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